TY - GEN
T1 - Practical quantum oblivious transfer
AU - Bennett, Charles H.
AU - Brassard, Gilles
AU - Crépeaut, Claude
AU - Skubiszewska, Marie Hélène
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1992.
PY - 1992
Y1 - 1992
N2 - We describe a protocol for quantum oblivious transfer, utilizing faint pulses of polarized light, by which one of two mutually distrustful parties (“Alice”) transmits two one-bit messages in such a way that the other party (“Bob”) can choose which message he gets but cannot obtain information about both messages (he will learn his chosen bit’s value with exponentially small error probability and may gain at most exponentially little information about the value of the other bit), and Alice will be entirely ignorant of which bit he received. Neither party can cheat (ie deviate from the protocol while appearing to follow it) in such a way as to obtain more information than what is given by the description of the protocol. Our protocol is easy to modify in order to implement the All-or-Nothing Disclosure of one out of two string messages, and it can be used to implement bit commitment and oblivious circuit evaluation without complexity-theoretic assumptions, in a way that remains secure even against cheaters that have unlimited computing power. Moreover, this protocol is practical in that it can be realized with available optoelectronic apparatus while being immune to any technologically feasible attack for the foreseeable future.
AB - We describe a protocol for quantum oblivious transfer, utilizing faint pulses of polarized light, by which one of two mutually distrustful parties (“Alice”) transmits two one-bit messages in such a way that the other party (“Bob”) can choose which message he gets but cannot obtain information about both messages (he will learn his chosen bit’s value with exponentially small error probability and may gain at most exponentially little information about the value of the other bit), and Alice will be entirely ignorant of which bit he received. Neither party can cheat (ie deviate from the protocol while appearing to follow it) in such a way as to obtain more information than what is given by the description of the protocol. Our protocol is easy to modify in order to implement the All-or-Nothing Disclosure of one out of two string messages, and it can be used to implement bit commitment and oblivious circuit evaluation without complexity-theoretic assumptions, in a way that remains secure even against cheaters that have unlimited computing power. Moreover, this protocol is practical in that it can be realized with available optoelectronic apparatus while being immune to any technologically feasible attack for the foreseeable future.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84969361843
U2 - 10.1007/3-540-46766-1_29
DO - 10.1007/3-540-46766-1_29
M3 - Contribution to conference proceedings
AN - SCOPUS:84969361843
SN - 9783540551881
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 351
EP - 366
BT - Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO 1991, Proceedings
A2 - Feigenbaum, Joan
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 11th Confrence on Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO 1991
Y2 - 11 August 1991 through 15 August 1991
ER -