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ExploitGen: automated smart contract vulnerability verification via taxonomy specialized multi-agent detection and proof-of-concept exploit generation

  • Aysheh Aminnezhad

Student thesis: Master's thesis › Master in Engineering: Engineering

Abstract

Smart contracts underpin decentralized finance (DeFi), where software vulnerabilities cause irreversible financial losses. Existing automated auditing approaches face a detection–verification gap: static analyzers and single-agent large language model (LLM) systems exhibit low recall, whereas unverified multi-agent architectures achieve high recall at the cost of prohibitive false-positive rates that overwhelm human auditors and negate the efficiency benefits of automation. This thesis presents ExploitGen, a LangGraph orchestrated multi-agent pipeline that closes this gap by coupling taxonomy-specialized detection with executable verification. Eight detection agents, each scoped to a single OpenSCV category, first maximize recall. Each candidate then passes through a verification sequence: static graph extraction, falsification-first validation, semantic characterization, Structured Chain-of-Thought (SCoT) attack planning, proof-of-concept (PoC) synthesis, and counterfactual confirmation. A vulnerability is confirmed only when its generated Foundry PoC passes on the vulnerable contract and fails on a signature-preserving patched counterpart, establishing exploitability causally rather than by syntactic resemblance. Evaluated on the SB Curated benchmark against 139 ground truth vulnerabilities, ExploitGen verifies 86 counterfactually confirmed exploits at a confirmation yield of 0.741 and an F1-score of 0.675. Against a single-attempt configuration of the same pipeline, unconfirmed candidates fall by 23.1% while confirmed exploits rise from 73 to 86. Against the detection-only paradigm, which uses unscoped parallel detection, unconfirmed findings fall from 342 to 30. A controlled ablation shows that SCoT planning improves reentrancy F1 by 0.200 but degrades access-control performance, establishing that component selection must be adapted to the vulnerability class. The augmented dataset of 139 patched contracts is released to support reproducibility.
Date7 Sept 2026
Original languageAmerican English
Awarding Institution
  • École de technologie supérieure
SupervisorKaiwen Zhang (Supervisor) & Camille Coti (Co-supervisor)

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