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Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle

  • University of Montreal

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal › Article publié dans une revue, révisé par les pairs › Revue par des pairs

Résumé

One explanation of rational peer disagreement is that agents find themselves in an epistemically permissive situation. In fact, some authors have suggested that, while evidence could be impermissive at the intrapersonal level, it is permissive at the interpersonal level. In this paper, I challenge such a claim. I will argue that, at least in cases of rational disagreement under full disclosure (i.e., the cases in which epistemic peers are fully aware of each other’s evidence and arguments), there cannot be more interpersonal epistemically permissive situations than there are intrapersonal epistemically permissive situations. In other words, with respect to cases of disagreement under full disclosure, I will argue that there is a necessary connection (or a “bridge”) between interpersonal permissiveness and its intrapersonal counterpart. Specifically, I claim that a plausible principle of correct argumentation supports such a bridge.

Langue originaleAnglais
Pages (de - à)1213-1223
Nombre de pages11
RevueTopoi
Volume40
Numéro de publication5
Les DOIs
ÉtatPublié - nov. 2021
Modification externeOui

Classification disciplinaire ASJC Scopus

  • Philosophie

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