@inproceedings{a273725e5d7e4754b36657365ab60d95,
title = "Testing minimax for rational ignorant agents",
abstract = "Richard Pettigrew [13, 14] defends the following theses: (1) epistemic disutility can be measured with strictly proper scoring rules (like the Brier score) and (2) at the beginning of their credal lives, rational agents ought to minimize their worst-case epistemic disutility (Minimax). This leads to a Principle of Indifference for ignorant agents. However, Pettigrew offers no argument in favour of Minimax, suggesting that the epistemic conservatism underlying it is a {\textquotedblleft}normative bedrock.{\textquotedblright} Is there a way to test Minimax? In this paper, we argue that, since Pettigrew{\textquoteright}s Minimax is impermissive, an argument against credence permissiveness constitutes an argument in favour of Minimax, and that arguments for credence permissiveness are arguments against Minimax.",
keywords = "Minimax, Objective bayesianism, Permissiveness, Rationality, Scoring rule, Uniqueness",
author = "Daoust, \{Marc Kevin\} and David Montminy",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany 2017.; 15th International Conference on Business Process Management, BPM 2017 ; Conference date: 10-09-2017 Through 15-09-2017",
year = "2017",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-662-55665-8\_37",
language = "English",
isbn = "9783319649993",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",
publisher = "Springer Verlag",
pages = "541--553",
editor = "Jeremy Seligman and Tomoyuki Yamada and Alexandru Baltag",
booktitle = "Business Process Management - 15th International Conference, BPM 2017, Proceedings",
}