Abstract
Many philosophers have offered arguments in favor of the following three theses: (i) A is epistemically permitted (or required) to believe P only if A is in a position to know that P, (ii) incoherent agents fail to satisfy the aforementioned knowledge norm of belief, and (iii) A’s apparent reasons are relevant to determining what A is blameworthy for believing. In this paper, I argue that the above three theses are jointly inconsistent. The main upshot of the paper is this: even if the knowledge norm of belief is correct, it cannot explain some deontic requirements governing belief.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 493-503 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | Acta Analytica |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Dec 2019 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Apparent reasons
- Blame
- Coherence
- Epistemic norms
- Knowledge
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy
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