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A Puzzle About Knowledge, Blame, and Coherence

  • University of Montreal

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal Article › peer-review

Abstract

Many philosophers have offered arguments in favor of the following three theses: (i) A is epistemically permitted (or required) to believe P only if A is in a position to know that P, (ii) incoherent agents fail to satisfy the aforementioned knowledge norm of belief, and (iii) A’s apparent reasons are relevant to determining what A is blameworthy for believing. In this paper, I argue that the above three theses are jointly inconsistent. The main upshot of the paper is this: even if the knowledge norm of belief is correct, it cannot explain some deontic requirements governing belief.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)493-503
Number of pages11
JournalActa Analytica
Volume34
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2019
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Apparent reasons
  • Blame
  • Coherence
  • Epistemic norms
  • Knowledge

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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