Résumé
Many philosophers have offered arguments in favor of the following three theses: (i) A is epistemically permitted (or required) to believe P only if A is in a position to know that P, (ii) incoherent agents fail to satisfy the aforementioned knowledge norm of belief, and (iii) A’s apparent reasons are relevant to determining what A is blameworthy for believing. In this paper, I argue that the above three theses are jointly inconsistent. The main upshot of the paper is this: even if the knowledge norm of belief is correct, it cannot explain some deontic requirements governing belief.
| Langue originale | Anglais |
|---|---|
| Pages (de - à) | 493-503 |
| Nombre de pages | 11 |
| Revue | Acta Analytica |
| Volume | 34 |
| Numéro de publication | 4 |
| Les DOIs | |
| État | Publié - 1 déc. 2019 |
| Modification externe | Oui |
Classification disciplinaire ASJC Scopus
- Philosophie
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