Skip to main navigation Skip to search Skip to main content

Epistemic Consequentialism, Veritism, and Scoring Rules

  • Harvard University
  • Carleton University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal Article › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We argue that there is a tension between two monistic claims that are the core of recent work in epistemic consequentialism. The first is a form of monism about epistemic value, commonly known as veritism: accuracy is the sole final objective to be promoted in the epistemic domain. The other is a form of monism about a class of epistemic scoring rules: that is, strictly proper scoring rules are the only legitimate measures of inaccuracy. These two monisms, we argue, are in tension with each other. If only accuracy has final epistemic value, then there are legitimate alternatives to strictly proper scoring rules. Our argument relies on the way scoring rules are used in contexts where accuracy is rewarded, such as education.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1741-1765
Number of pages25
JournalErkenntnis
Volume88
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2023
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Logic

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Epistemic Consequentialism, Veritism, and Scoring Rules'. These topics are generated from the title and abstract of the publication. Together, they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this