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Epistemic Consequentialism, Veritism, and Scoring Rules

  • Harvard University
  • Carleton University

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal › Article publié dans une revue, révisé par les pairs › Revue par des pairs

2 Citations (Scopus)

Résumé

We argue that there is a tension between two monistic claims that are the core of recent work in epistemic consequentialism. The first is a form of monism about epistemic value, commonly known as veritism: accuracy is the sole final objective to be promoted in the epistemic domain. The other is a form of monism about a class of epistemic scoring rules: that is, strictly proper scoring rules are the only legitimate measures of inaccuracy. These two monisms, we argue, are in tension with each other. If only accuracy has final epistemic value, then there are legitimate alternatives to strictly proper scoring rules. Our argument relies on the way scoring rules are used in contexts where accuracy is rewarded, such as education.

Langue originaleAnglais
Pages (de - à)1741-1765
Nombre de pages25
RevueErkenntnis
Volume88
Numéro de publication4
Les DOIs
ÉtatPublié - avr. 2023
Modification externeOui

Classification disciplinaire ASJC Scopus

  • Philosophie
  • Logique

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